While the severity of sexual violence in these cases certainly warrants close examination, focus on these two conflicts has resulted in mono-causal theories of sexual violence as a weapon of ethnic cleansing or genocide (Allen, 1996; Bloom, 1999; Mullins, 2009; Sharlach, 2000) .
Thinking more broadly, sexual violence has a number of perverse benefits as a potential weapon of war: it is relatively cheap and easy to use; it can boost the morale and unity of armed groups (Cohen, 2013) ; and it can supplement the incomes of combatants. Perhaps most importantly, in societies with deeply held social mores about women's honor and purity, sexual violence may be a particularly effective repressive and demoralizing weapon (Allen, 1996; Bastick et al., 2007) . Because of the intimate nature of the attack on a person's understanding of self, sexual violence can be an effective method of neutralizing political opponents without killing them. As one scholar describes:
[w]ith the help of different torture methods, the authorities seek to remove any human, reliable, or mutual relationship and thereby bring the prisoner into a state of extreme physical and psychological regression, where it is no longer possible to relate to the body, to the world outside or to other people. (Agger & Jensen, 1986, p. 307) . 3
Sexual violence may be used as a form of state terrorism to induce fear widely throughout the civilian population. As the state increases its repressive campaign against civilians, the fear of being targeted will dissuade a potential recruit from joining the ranks or providing aid to the armed opposition (Valentino, 2004) . Similarly, the state may use sexual violence against suspected "enemies of the state" to punish them for their opposition activities.
Potential targets could include members of armed rebel groups, opposition political parties, or "subversive" community organizations, as well as those who support them. By targeting individuals for their participation in dissident organizations, states effectively signal to potential recruits their fate if they behave similarly and may induce some subversives either to abandon or betray the opposition (Kalyvas, 2006) . Whether targeted or indiscriminate in scope, the effect of the violence is the same; it undermines the ability of armed opposition groups to recruit and retain members or supporters.
In addition to undercutting the source of strength of the rebels, the state may also use sexual violence to collect intelligence on the opposition movement. The state may employ sexualized torture techniques during the interrogation of a suspected guerrilla to gather information about the identity of rebels, location of their camps or their military strategies, as was recently reported at the U.S. detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Bagram airbase in Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib in Iraq. Accounts suggest that detainees were subjected to a multitude of sexual abuses during interrogation and detention, ranging from being stripped and photographed nude, forced masturbation, rape, sodomy and simulations of electric shock torture (Human Rights Watch, 2004a & b; Leonning & Priest, 2005) . 
General Characteristics
In both conflicts, sexual violence was but one form of repression used by the state.
According to the human rights denunciations collected for this study, sexual violence comprised approximately 1% and 5% of all state-perpetrated violence during the Salvadoran and Peruvian civil wars, respectively. Because it is difficult (and perhaps impossible) to accurately approximate the overall frequency of sexual violence, caution should be used when drawing inferences regarding these figures (for a complete discussion of obstacles in estimating the level of sexual violence in El Salvador and Peru, please see Leiby, 2011 Leiby, & 2012 .
Despite the difficulty in estimating the overall frequency of wartime sexual violence, there is ample documentation that state security agents in both countries often used sexual violence against political prisoners. Of the more than 700 acts of sexual violence recorded in the database, a large percentage of them -56% in El Salvador and 42% in Peru -were perpetrated inside state-run detention facilities against political prisoners. These crimes occurred in both formal and informal prisons, military bases and police stations. In both countries, the most frequent forms of sexual violence used against detainees were: sexual humiliation (42%), rape and gang rape (23%), sexual torture (21%) and attempted or threatened acts of sexual violence (11%). Although forced abortion and sexual mutilation were reported to have occurred in both countries, this does not appear to have been a pattern of abuse within detention facilities.
In both countries, sexual violence against political prisoners was heavily concentrated in urban centers, notably San Salvador (51% of all such cases in El Salvador) and Lima (34% in Peru). In addition, sexual violence in detention centers was significantly more frequent during periods when the states' counterinsurgency strategies emphasized population control measures, such as the detention, interrogation and abuse of suspected "terrorists." In Peru in the early 1990s, for example, President Fujimori redirected the state's counterinsurgency efforts to include more targeted operations that distinguished among friendly, neutral and enemy populations.
Fujimori established a new special-operations intelligence group (known as GEIN) within the National Counter-terrorism Directorate (DINCOTE) whose sole mission was to identify members of the Shining Path and gather intelligence that would lead to the capture of their leader, Abimael Guzmán. During this period, the overall level of violence against civilians fell (CVR, 2004) . However, at the same time, sexual violence, particularly against political prisoners, rose markedly. In fact, almost half of all detention-related sexual offenses during the civil war occurred during Fujimori's presidency. This could indicate that counterterror police forces were ordered to commit sexual violence or that they were given carte-blanche to use whatever means necessary in the pursuit of Peru's "public enemy #1."
The level of sexual violence in El Salvador similarly correlates with changes in the state's counterinsurgency strategy. The most significant shift came in 1984 after a visit by then U.S.
Vice President George H. W. Bush, who threatened the withdrawal of military aid, particularly (Peceny & Stanley, 2010) . Careful to avoid international scrutiny, the state moved its repressive operations behind closed doors. This change in policy resulted in a decrease in the level of lethal violence, but at the same time led to an increase in the arbitrary detention, torture and sexual abuse of individuals suspected of "subversion." That the armed forces' repertoire of violence shifted so quickly (and in response to a vital security concern) suggests that commanders had at least some knowledge of and control over their subordinates' behavior.
Victims
Included in the database are 291 unique victims, each of whom suffered at least one form of sexual abuse while in state custody. According to the data, 66% of victims of sexual violence in Salvadoran detention facilities were men. This is significantly higher than is commonly thought and significantly higher than that reported in Peru (32%). This finding is confirmed by the non-governmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (CDHES). In a unique study of torture at La Esperanza men's prison between January and August 1986, the CDHES found that 76% of the 434 prisoners interviewed had suffered one or more forms of sexual violence.
According to the testimonies, the most common forms of sexual violence were forced nudity (58%), genital beatings (20%), electric torture (14%), threats of rape (15%) and rape (0.5%) (CDHES, 1986) .
As is often the case, men in Peru and El Salvador were more likely to be viewed as political threats, and as a result, were more likely to be detained by the state and subsequently Both male and female victims were often young (between 20-30 years old), unmarried and either a recent graduate or current university student. Students and teachers made up more than one-third of the political prisoners subjected to sexual violence. As rebel groups frequently recruit members from high schools and universities, it is unsurprising that the state would target this subgroup of the population for repression.
Sexual violence was often reserved for prisoners who were accused of being members of or collaborating with "terrorist" or "subversive" organizations. Individuals could come under the suspicion of the state for belonging to an opposition political party, labor union, or any number of community-based groups thought to be fronts for rebel organizing. Thirty-eight percent of victims of sexual violence in detention were accused of being terrorists; however, only six percent actually confessed to being members of the FMLN or SL. While political prisoners certainly have no incentive to declare an association with armed guerrilla groups, it is quite likely that this figure reflects the states' indiscriminate anti-terrorist policy, which failed to distinguish between legal and illegal opposition organizations.
Lastly, victims of sexual violence in detention centers were very often the targets of repeated abuse by the state. Twenty percent of victims reported having previously been the victims of human rights abuse or knowing someone who was. As it is statistically improbable that an individual would be victimized more than once by chance, this kind of repeated abuse may suggest an intentional targeting on the part of the state. Both the regular Army and police forces were more likely to engage in sexual humiliation than any other form of sexual violence (39% and 43% of all sexual abuses perpetrated by the military and police, respectively). Beyond sexual humiliation, the Army was much more likely to rape or gang rape detainees, while police officers committed various forms of sexual torture, including blunt genital trauma, electrical torture and genital cutting.
Context
As this chapter focuses solely on sexual violence within detention centers, one might assume that most, if not all, acts of sexual violence occurred during the interrogation of "suspects." However, only 36% and 23% of all reported acts of sexual violence in El Salvador (TL, 10.1.13). Stripping prisoners is a common tactic used by the police to underscore the detainee's vulnerability and in this case attack the victim's identity as a heterosexual man, both of which serve to disarm and disorient the prisoner, making him more malleable.
Despite these cases, the vast majority of sexual violence in detention centers was not perpetrated during interrogation sessions. Instead, as the examples below demonstrate, state armed actors used sexual violence as a common form of punishment, often alongside other forms of physical and psychological torture. In this context, sexual violence can so thoroughly We have been following you for 5 years" (CDHES, 1986, p. 102) . The next day the torture and questioning resumed. They shocked him with 320 volts of electricity on his tongue and ears and he passed out. After reviving him, they shocked him again, this time on his penis and anus.
In his testimony, Alejandro stated that unlike others in the community who were also detained, but who were targeted collectively because they lived in La Palma, he was singled out for the worst forms of torture because the authorities suspected him of being a guerrilla commander. As his testimony reflects, Alejandro was sexually victimized during police interrogation. However, he insists the attack was designed not to elicit information, but to destroy him. According to his testimony, this method of torture was effective: after only two days of detention and torture at the GN base, he began to lose track of time; he began to lose his mind and would have said anything for them to stop the abuse (CDHES, 1986, p. 102-109) . Despite significant differences in the domestic and international political environment, as well as the strength, tactics and goals of the insurgency, the Salvadoran and Peruvian military and police engaged in a clear pattern of frequent sexual abuse against political opponents and detainees. These abuses ranged from forced nudity to rape and sexual torture. They were perpetrated against men and women, teachers and students, and others suspected of supporting the FMLN or SL. They were perpetrated during interrogation and/or torture sessions. Attempts to prove the "weapon of war" thesis face several challenges (see Agirre
Aranburu, 2012 for a full discussion). Among the most difficult is the absence of evidence of direct orders or a military policy to commit sexual violence. However, the lack of such evidence does not preclude the possibility of a state strategy. Requiring definitive proof of this kind sets an unachievable standard and unnecessarily privileges state impunity.
I argue that when there is a clear pattern of sexual violence occurring at times and places and in contexts which appear beneficial to the state's goals; when sexual abuse is targeted against particular subgroups of the population, perpetrated in state-controlled detention centers, often with the express knowledge or participation of high-ranking officers (as in the case of Leonardo, described above), and when these crimes go uninvestigated and unpunished, it is untenable to suggest that leaders had no knowledge of and did not benefit from the continued practice of sexual violence. According to the evidence presented, the sexual abuse of political prisoners in El Salvador and Peru was either explicitly ordered by the politico-military command or was permitted under a doctrine of total warfare, wherein "anything goes" in the state's fight against "terrorism." In both scenarios, sexual violence can be seen as a strategic weapon of war, used to advance the state's interests and goals.
While the conclusions drawn from such work must be considered preliminary, attempts like this one to better document and examine the variable patterns of wartime sexual violence are 
